After emerging victorious from the Battle of Buxar (1765), the East India Company (EIC) was able to obtain the diwani of Bengal. As the beneficiaries of the diwani, the East India Company acquired the right to collective revenue and administer justice throughout the region.1 Initially, the EIC utilized this newfound stream of income to finance a burgeoning military and bureaucracy to more efficiently manage Bengal and its people. However, the British acclimation to Bengali rule was fraught with difficulties. Where the Mughal Empire took 150 years to implement an effective system of coercion for revenue in rural Bengal, the Company was trying to accomplish this task in a number of years.2 These organizational networks still existed, but the British officers were ignorant to the intricacies of Bengali landholding. This blindspot hindered the ability of the EIC to collect the necessary revenue to maintain hold of Bengal. After suffering financial loss after loss, the Company set out to find the easiest way to collect the most revenue from Bengal.1 As such, the years between 1765 and 1793 were wrought by the quick circulation of one revenue system after another. This British struggle to implement an effective revenue system was caused in part by misunderstandings ⎯ the Bengali landholding system was diametrically opposed to British ideals of private property and individual liability. For one, the Company entirely misconstrued the role of zamindars (land owners) in agrarian society. Bengali zamindars did not function as “landlords” because they did not “own” the land that they collected revenue from. Instead, “property rights” were dispersed amongst the zamindar, ryot (peasant cultivator), and government. In this manner, zamindars served to collect rent revenue from the ryots, keep some funds for themselves, and distribute the rest to the government. As such, zamindars could sell their own revenue collecting rights, but not the land itself, as it did not belong to them.3 This complex and functional social dynamic was thrown into disarray, however, when the EIC came into power. The effort to institute efficient systems of revenue collection resulted in the complete realignment of power in rural society.4
The East India Company introduced several new figures to the Bengali landholding system in an attempt to curb perceived inefficiencies with revenue collection. For one, zamindars were deemed proprietors of the soil, imbuing the individual zamindar with complete ownership of the land.5 In this manner, ryots were “handed over” to the zamindars. Seemingly overnight, ryots became reduced to the status of tenants without rights. At the same time, the Company government was deeply hostile towards the zamindars. Zamindars were perceived as untrustworthy because the Company government was unable to assess the exact amount of revenue funds taken from the ryots and pocketed for themselves. This was pertinent because the company aimed to take more revenue from the ryots but without the zamindars taking more from the ryots.5 The solution was to implement Company appointed “revenue farmers”. In doing this, the Company government sold revenue rights for a five year period to regional magnates.1 This method, it was reasoned, would give the Company choice in the matter of revenue intermediaries; such that the Company would be able to select which individuals would “farm” the land for revenue. Nevertheless, revenue farmers proved to be worse off than the zamindars. Zamindars were liable to having their land sold if there was a default in payment, and could be removed if deemed necessary by the Company.3 In contrast, revenue farmers could not be as easily controlled by the Company because they had already paid for revenue rights prior to their five year period of land ownership. Furthermore, revenue farmers held no personal stake in the land; thus they were susceptible to failing in their obligations to the Company, oppressing riots, and absconding without notice.6 In this manner, there were several pivotal incidents where the farming system generated more financial loss for the Company, moreover, it contributed to great turmoil amongst zamindars and ryots alike.1
Along the same lines as revenue farmers, the Company also implemented district Collectors to assist in the revenue collection process. Collectorships were highly lucrative positions that were often closely aligned with revenue farmers.7 In his tenure as collector of Purnea, Gerard Gustavus Ducarel bore witness to the actions of a prominent Company-appointed revenue farmer, Raja Devi Singh. In 1772, the ryots of Purnea lodged a formal legal complaint against Devi Singh. They alleged that Devi Singh oppressed them for revenue by brutal means, such as burning them with hot iron on their bodies. Furthermore, the ryots claimed that Devi Singh monopolized grain during the famine. He reportedly purchased their rice at below the market rate, but also seized the rice from their homes and transported it to his own granaries. After hoarding all the ryots’ rice, he sold it at an exorbitant price during the famine.9 As a result, hundreds of ryots perished.8 However, G.G. Ducarel was not amenable to these claims. In a letter defending Devi Singh, Ducarel called the accusation about the famine a "barefaced and notorious Falsehood." Ducarel dismissed the complaints as trifling matters, and praised Devi Singh’s behavior and character.10 In the end, Devi Singh was acquitted of all wrongdoing by the Committee of Circuit at Kasimbazar.9
Devi Singh is a prime example of how the Company stirred agrarian agitation. That is, the many conflicts regarding Devi Sing illustrate the contentious relationship between the Company and the ryots of Bengal. After losing his position in Purnea, Raja Devi Singh was set to collect the revenue of Rangpur for a three year period, beginning in 1781.11 However, Devi Singh was an outsider to Rangpur, and was frequently absent from his post in the district. When it came time for him to deliver revenue to the Company government, he attempted to extract money from the Rangpur ryots by using increasingly brutal methods. Devi Singh reportedly “tortured the peasants both physically and psychologically.”12 Devi Singh was accused of a myriad of abuses, such as: levying impossibly high taxes on ryots and zamindars, using corporal punishment (e.g. beatings) for unpaid revenue, imposing illegal taxes, imprisoning zamindar Shiv Chand Chowdhury for complaining to the Company, and selling the zamindars’ land.12 Eventually, the incessant abuses led to the Rangpur dhing in 1783 ⎯ a massive rebellion primarily consisting of the Rangpur ryots. The rebels imprisoned zamindars, forced Devi Singh’s revenue officers to flee, and captured and tried several officers. The rebellion became increasingly violent over its months-long tenure, leading to several brutal deaths of Devi Singh’s representatives.13 Once the rebellion was quelled by armed force, Devi Singh was investigated and tried for his abuses against the ryots and zamindars of Rangpur. The East India Company government fully sided with Devi Singh, allowing him to fully evade justice, as well as refunding his lands and money.14
In a letter from Goodlad to Ducarel, dated August 19 1784, Goodlad explains how two figures in the company, McPherson and Stables, worked to prosecute Devi Singh for his abuses. In doing so, they suspended Richard Goodlad as Collector of Ranpur. However, Goodlad and his allies worked tirelessly to help Devi Singh leave confinement and seek safety.15 Goodlad does not once mention the ryots in this letter, instead discussing his concerns regarding his debt and reputation. He says to Ducarel, “this Business I suppose will make a noise at home – therefore whenever you have an opportunity you must help us as much as you can.”15 This letter conveys how Company servants, like Goodlad, were not occupied with governing the ryots, but were instead focused on advancing their own fortune and status. Indeed, Company servants sought appointments in India to amass fortunes for themselves rather than serve honourable employment.2 British officers did not have enough time to learn civil administration and the operations of rural Bengal Prior to the Company takeover. Thus, they approached administration with commercial rather than governmental training.2
Furthermore, Devi Singh also had brushes with members of Sharuf Un-Nisa own family. In <a href="https://unstable-archives.github.io/unstable_archives/unstable_archives/item19/>this letter</a> sent from Daim Beg to his sister Sharuf un-Nisa, Daim Beg reports that Devi Singh has not paid the family an established sum in nearly 6 months. As a result, they have written letters to Devi Singh, Mister Redfearn, and brother Mirza Alim Beg to understand what the issue is. This letter is dated for after 1784.16 In another letter from Sharuf Un-Nisa’s brother Alim Beg, he explains that he is owed two thousand rupees, but that the receipt for that money is with Raja Devi Singh. However, Alim Beg has not yet received the money. He asks G.G. Ducarel if he can request the receipt from Raja Singh, and then send it to the moneyholder so that the family may be able to receive the two thousand rupees. Furthermore, Alim Beg describes how there was an agreement between G.G. Ducarel and the Rajah of Burdwan to give Alim Beg a monthly stipend of 100 Rupees. In this manner, Alim Beg was set to receive 1,200 rupees per year. According to Alim Beg, Raja Devi Singh knew of this deal, yet no moves were made for Alim Beg to received the money. As such, Alim Beg asks G.G. Ducarel to send a letter in his own handwriting to Rajah of Burdwan addressing the issue.17
The East India Company government cycled through a myriad of revenue systems, but faltered in its attempts to fully deconstruct the Bengali agrarian landholding system. The constant indecision and experimentation of revenue systems ultimately led to the downfall of Company rule. Following the Indian Rebellion of 1857, the British Crown swiftly took control of the East India Company’s holdings in India. Around 1818, the British Crown implemented the Ryotwari System, a system of land revenue that also reshaped agrarian socioeconomic dynamics.4 In a move similar to that of the Company government, the British Crown eradicated the conceptualization of collective ownership of land. Where the village community once shared the responsibility of paying land tax together, the British Crown ensured that each cultivator was responsible for their own payment of land tax.4 In contrast to the Company government, land came under the ownership of the cultivators themselves, not a singular zamindar. This attempt at creating a social contract between the state and individual had dire consequences for the ryots. Oftentimes the ryots struggled to pay rent on time due to the unpredictable nature of weather conditions. As a result, they sought out loans from moneylenders, leading to exorbitant and ever increasing debt.18
Ryot:
Zamindar:
Sepoy:
Soubadaree:
Diwani:
1: Wilson, Jon E., “‘A Thousand Countries to Go To’: Peasants and Rulers in Late Eighteenth‑Century Bengal.” Past & Present no. 189 (November 2005): 85–86. https://doi.org/10.1093/pastj/gti023.
2: Lees, James. “‘A Character to Lose’: Richard Goodlad, the Rangpur Dhing, and the Priorities of the East India Company’s Early Colonial Administrators.” Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society 25, no. 2 (2015): 304. https://doi-org.proxy.library.upenn.edu/10.1017/S1356186314000571.
3: Metcalf, Barbara D., and Thomas R. Metcalf. A Concise History of Modern India. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006.
4: Kumar, Ravinder. “The Deccan Riots of 1875.” The Journal of Asian Studies 24, no. 4 (August 1965): 614. https://doi.org/10.2307/2051108.
5: Wright, H. R. C. “Some Aspects of the Permanent Settlement in Bengal.” The Economic History Review 7, no. 2 (1954): 204–205. https://doi.org/10.2307/2591622.
6: Wright, H. R. C. “Some Aspects of the Permanent Settlement in Bengal.” The Economic History Review 7, no. 2 (1954): 206. https://doi.org/10.2307/2591622.
7: Lees, James. “‘A Character to Lose’: Richard Goodlad, the Rangpur Dhing, and the Priorities of the East India Company’s Early Colonial Administrators.” Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society 25, no. 2 (2015): 305.
8: British Library Bengal Committee of Circuit at Krishnagar Vol II–III, 96–99.
9: Chatterjee, Baijayanti. 2023. “Famine in a Rice Economy: Natural Calamities, Grain Scarcity and the Company-State in Bengal, 1770–1803.” South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies 46 (2): 380. doi:10.1080/00856401.2023.2178186.
10: British Library Bengal Committee of Circuit at Krishnagar Vol II–III, 152.
11: Lees, James. “‘A Character to Lose’: Richard Goodlad, the Rangpur Dhing, and the Priorities of the East India Company’s Early Colonial Administrators.” Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society 25, no. 2 (2015): 306. https://doi-org.proxy.library.upenn.edu/10.1017/S1356186314000571.
12: Sengupta, Amrita. “Rangpur in Transition: The Aftermath and Consequences of the Rangpur Dhing of 1783.” NSOU Open Journal 5, no. 2 (July 2022): 3.
13: Lees, James. “‘A Character to Lose’: Richard Goodlad, the Rangpur Dhing, and the Priorities of the East India Company’s Early Colonial Administrators.” Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society 25, no. 2 (2015): 307. https://doi-org.proxy.library.upenn.edu/10.1017/S1356186314000571.
14: Sengupta, Amrita. “Rangpur in Transition: The Aftermath and Consequences of the Rangpur Dhing of 1783.” NSOU Open Journal 5, no. 2 (July 2022): 8.
15: Letter 5. From Goodlad to G.G. Ducarel 19 August 1784 Page 3–4.
16: Letter A Packet of Letters: Daim Beg to John Shore; Daim Beg to Sharaf un-Nisa.
17: Letter Petition from 'Alim Beg to Elizabeth Sharaf un-Nisa Signed by 'Alim Beg + Envelope Sealed by Daim Beg.
18: Kumar, Ravinder. “The Deccan Riots of 1875.” The Journal of Asian Studies 24, no. 4 (August 1965): 616. <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2051108”>https://doi.org/10.2307/2051108</a>.